indus water treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed by India and Pakistan in 1960, has recently been seen both as the one agreement that has worked between India and Pakistan and as an anachronism which should be dissolved or renegotiated. On December 20, 2013, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) has issued a judgment which re-calibrates and modernises the IWT and, again makes it a critical and effective instrument in avoiding conflicts between India and Pakistan on use of the rivers of the Indus Basin.

It is first useful to reiterate the central elements of the treaty and the long-standing areas of contention. The IWT assigns use of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) to India and use of the western rivers (Chenab, Jhelum and Indus) to Pakistan. The biggest sticking point in negotiating the treaty in the 1950s was the conditions under which India could use the hydro-electric potential of the Chenab and the Jhelum before the rivers reached Pakistan.

The principle incorporated into the IWT was that, indeed, India could develop this potential, but only under a set of well-defined limitations on the amount of manipulable storage which could be created by India in the process, thus assuring Pakistan that India would not have the ability to manipulate either the timing or the quantities of the flows reaching Pakistan.

In the 1990s, a difference arose about the Baglihar Dam being built by India on the Chenab. Pakistan claimed that low gates installed for flushing sediments violated the specifications of the treaty and endangered Pakistan’s water security because it gave India a capacity to manipulate the timing of flows into Pakistan.

Recipe for conflict

In 2005, a Neutral Expert was appointed to hear the case. His finding essentially said that new knowledge of sediment management technology meant that India had to be allowed to install low gates. His finding ignored the central balance — between India’s right to generate hydropower and Pakistan’s right to unmanipulated flows — in the IWT. Since India plans to build many other projects on the Chenab and Jhelum, if the Baglihar ruling established new ground rules, this would, essentially, give India a free hand to do whatever it liked, leaving Pakistan vulnerable in both perception and practice. This was a recipe for growing conflict and, eventually, even war over the Indus.

In 2010, Pakistan took a new case, that of the Kishenganga hydro-electric project on the Jhelum river, to the International Court of Arbitration. On December 20, 2013, the court issued its final judgment. The Kishenganga case comprised two elements — was India within its rights to build the project and was India able to insert low gates? On the first, limited and specific issue, the court interpreted the treaty literally and accurately and allowed India to proceed. This will somewhat limit the yield of a Pakistani hydropower project being built downstream, but it is not a systemic issue. The big and systemic issue was the second. Here, the court reinforced the hard constraints built into the IWT regarding the ability of India to embed manipulable storage into this and all future projects.

Convenience vs water security

The court pointed out that while it might be convenient for India to build low gates and practise sediment flushing, this was not the only way to manage sediments, and that convenience for India had to be balanced against the threat this would pose to Pakistan’s water security. The court explicitly stated that the Baglihar ruling did not constitute a precedent and implied that the Baglihar Neutral Expert had erred by not balancing engineering concerns with the diplomatic and security factors which were at the heart of the IWT.

The decision by the PCA means that India can, as laid out by the IWT, continue to develop much-needed hydropower projects on the Chenab and the Jhelum, but it must strictly respect the IWT-defined limits on manipulable storage, and must use methods other than the construction of low gates to flush silt.

The court also played close attention to an area which had been neglected in the original IWT, namely environmental flows (e-flows). The court mandated a small, constant release which was less than 10% of what Pakistan claimed to be necessary. Again, the court underlined the importance of balance. “Although the court considered this approach (to defining the e-flow) to be somewhat severe in environmental terms, the court concluded that [….] such an approach represents an appropriate balance between the needs of the environment and India’s right to power generation”. This principle of balance and reasonableness is particularly important because it is inevitable that Pakistan will ask that India release e-flows from the eastern rivers (especially the Ravi and the Sutlej) into areas of Pakistan which have suffered major environmental damage as India has diverted all flows to the east.

The bottom line is that the brilliant and balanced work of the PCA means a new dawn for water management in the Indus. Rumblings over “water wars on the Indus” should now dissipate, and, once again, relationships between India and Pakistan on the Indus should become stable and perhaps have a positive ripple effect on relatioins between the two countries.

Kishenganga project

The Hague-based International Court of Arbitration has allowed India to go ahead with construction of the 330-MW Kishenganga hydro-electric project in North Kashmir which was under dispute with Pakistan.

In its final order delivered on Friday, the court upheld India’s right under the bilateral Indus Waters Treaty to divert waters from the Kishenganga for power generation in Jammu and Kashmir.

The court, however, decided that India shall release a minimum flow of nine cubic metres per second (cumecs) into the Kishenganga river (known as Neelam in Pakistan) below the project at all times to maintain environmental flows.

Although the decision is binding on both the parties and cannot be appealed, the court, chaired by Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (United States) decided that either India or Pakistan may seek reconsideration of the final order through the bilateral Permanent Indus Commission and the mechanisms of the Indus Waters Treaty after seven years from the first diversion of waters from the Kishenganga/Neelam river.

On India seeking a clarification on the drawdown flushing technique for clearing sedimentation in the run-of-the river project, it is understood that India may have to adopt a different technique for flushing in future projects.

Pakistan had apprehended that the drawdown flushing technique involving depletion of storage levels will affect flows at its down stream Neelam project.

On May 17, 2010, Pakistan moved for arbitration against India under the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty 1960 that regulates the use of waters in the shared rivers.

The Rs. 3600-crore Kishenganga project is designed to generate power by diverting water from a dam site on the Kishenganga to the Bonar Nallah, another tributary of the Jhelum, through tunnels.

Pakistan had challenged the project saying it was in violation of the treaty. However, the Arbitration Court has finally rejected Islamabad’s objections on this count.

The Ministry of External Affairs confirmed on Saturday that India had received the “final award” and the “court’s decision on India’s request for clarification” on Friday night.

“The quantum of 9 cumecs of natural flow of water that must be maintained in the Kishenganga at all times is “much lower” than the 100 cumecs of natural flow that Pakistan wanted India to ensure,” the Ministry said in a statement.

In its “Partial Award” delivered in February this year, the Court of Arbitration has already upheld India’s main contention that it has the right to divert waters of the western rivers, in a non-consumptive manner, for the optimal generation of power, the statement said.

siachen glacier

Why is Siachen Glacier important?

1. The Siachen glacier is considered to be the largest single source of fresh water on the Indian subcontinent.
2. It is located in the Karakoram range
3. Siachen is the source of the Nubra River that eventually feeds the mighty Indus— the major water source that irrigates the Punjab plains in Pakistan.
4. Siachen is near the Karakoram pass, forming almost a triangle with India, China and territory occupied by Pakistan touching the edges. 

How did the disagreement over the glacier start?

        

1. India and Pakistan have a disputed border in Jammu and Kashmir, most of it delineated as the Line of Control (LoC) with troop positions on either side.
2. While most positions were delineated as per the 1972 Shimla agreement, the boundary line was specified to only a point called NJ 9842, till the area from where Siachen starts.
3. The agreement stated that after this point, the boundary would proceed “north to the glaciers” without specifying which nation would have control over which area.
4. The matter remained non-controversial until the 1980s when the Indian Army discovered that Pakistan was issuing permission to foreign expeditions to trek in Siachen. Indian intelligence agencies found out that Pakistan army under orders from General Zia was planning to conduct a military operation to capture Siachen, from their supplier of High Altitude mountain warfare gear provider in London, (as Pakistan had placed orders for Arctic gear from the same supplier) Thus the Indian army launched Operation Meghdoot and Indian troops belonged to the Kumaon Regiment were air-lifted and moved into the glacier.

Where do the two sides disagree?

1. India’s stance is that the LoC runs from point NJ 9842 along the watersheds formed by the Saltoro ridge that puts the entire Siachen glacier within Indian territory.
2. Pakistan claims that the line joins point NJ 9842 with the Karakoram pass that lies towards the northeast, putting Siachen within its territory.

The ground position now is that the Indian Army controls the entire Saltoro ridge. There is no presence of Pakistani troops on the Siachen glacier. In fact, the nearest Pakistani locations are on the lower reaches of the Saltoro ridge.

How much does India control today?

1. As India managed to get the upper hand, it currently controls all heights along the glacier on the Saltoro ridge and uses the glacier as a logistics base.
2. Since 2007, India has been promoting treks and expeditions by civilians and foreigners in the vicinity of the glacier to reaffirm its claim on the region.
3. The Army has given permission to several groups of mountaineers to climb peaks in the Eastern Karakoram range that adjoins the glacier. The Army also holds a civilian Siachen expedition every year and will in the future invite even foreigners to trek up the glacier.

Where do negotiations stand?

1. A year after India took over the glacier in 1984, talks started.
2. After 13 rounds, both sides are now in agreement that the Siachen glacier should be demilitarised.
3. The disagreement is on how this withdrawal of troops will take place. The Indian position is that both nations should jointly demarcate the current troop positions in the region. This would involve an exhaustive process to determine and delineate current troops positions both on the ground and on a map. After this demarcation or “authentication” of troop positions, India believes, troops can be moved back to pre-1984 positions and the border issue can be solved with dialogue.
4. Pakistan agrees that the issue should be resolved with talks but is strongly against a demarcation of troop positions.
5. Pakistan believes that any joint demarcation or authentication of troops positions can be used as a claim by India for future talks to resolve the matter. It insists instead on a mutual withdrawal of troops to pre-1984 deployments for talks to begin.
6. India, however, has hardened its stance for authentication of troops positions after the 1999 Kargil conflict in which insurgents supported by the Pakistani Army occupied critical locations along the LoC.
7. India wants a demarcation so that it can take military action, if necessary, should Pakistan stealthily occupy troops positions even after vacating these as per the demilitarisation plan.

What is the way forward?

A number of suggestions have been made on how the problem can be resolved, including

1. declaring the area a peace park,
2. joint patrolling of the region
3. international peacekeeping force being deployed in the region.

However, the Indian Army stand, which is backed by the government, is very strict on the point of authentication of troop positions.
The argument is that a demarcation will not take anything away from Pakistan on the negotiating table as current troop positions is a hard, cold fact.
Marking the positions on a map, the Army believes, will facilitate a comfortable withdrawal of troops from both sides.
Pakistan, on the other hand, believes India’s “occupation” of the glacier is illegal and hence cannot be authenticated jointly by both sides, lest it get validation.

What is Senkaku/Diaoyu islands

What is Senkaku/Diaoyu islands:

• Eight uninhabited islands and rocks in question lie in the East China Sea. They have a total area of about 7 sq km and lie northeast of Taiwan
• These group of islands are known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China.
• Both Japan and China claim ownership of these islands.
• They matter because they are close to strategically important shipping lanes, offer rich fishing grounds and are thought to contain oil deposits.
• Right now, the islands are controlled by Japan.
• 

What is Japan's claim?

• After World War II Japan renounced claims to a number of territories and islands including Taiwan in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco.
• But under the treaty the Nansei Shoto islands came under US trusteeship and were then returned to Japan in 1971.
• Japan says that Senkaku islands are part of the Nansei Shoto islands and hence they also belong to Japan.
• Besides, China raised no objections to the San Francisco deal. but only since the 1970s, when the issue of oil resources in the area emerged, that Chinese and Taiwanese authorities began pressing their claims.

What is China's claim?

• These Islands have been part of its territory since ancient times, serving as important fishing grounds administered by the province of Taiwan.
• Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, after the Sino-Japanese war.
• When Taiwan was returned in the Treaty of San Francisco, China says the islands – as part of it – should also have been returned.

Conflict in recent times

• In 2010, Japan seized a Chinese trawler that collided with two coast guard vessels near to the islands, sparking a serious diplomatic row. Small anti-Japanese protests were held in several cities in China. However, in the end, Japan released the entire crew of the trawler – first the 14-member crew and then the captain, several days later.
• August 2012: a group of Pro-China activists sailed to the islands from Hong Kong, with seven landing on one island. All 14 on board, including journalists and crew members, have been detained by Japanese authorities.

Ref

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139